

Enforcing Security in Programming Languages using Separation Logic

Horia V. Corcalciuc

University of Birmingham

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- Increasing number of attacks on **unsafe code** usually based on the lack of **logical reasoning** at the programming stage.
- The lack of a logical implementation to reason about issues such as concurrency in **low level languages**.
- Two dead projects: **Vault** and **Cyclone**. The former is developed by Microsoft but ceased to be updated in 2004 and not even supporting threads while the latter seems abandoned.
- No complete dialect of C implementing logical reasoning such as **Hoare** and **separation logic**.

What we can do

- Reason about exploits using logic and try to eliminate them using **static** and **runtime checks**.
- Implement a safe dialect of C that will **refuse to compile insecure code**.
- Port libraries to make code compiled against them be **partially secure**.
- Implement Hoare-logic pre- and postconditions at **language level** allowing the programmer to implement his own checks.
- Make non thread-safe functions thread safe and non reentry safe functions reentry safe.

Hoare and Separation Logic

- We use Hoare logic to reason about program flow.

Example

$$\{precondition\} command_1 \{postcondition_1\}$$

$$\{postcondition_1\} command_2 \{postcondition_2\}$$

- We use separation logic to reason about memory.

Example

$\{emp\}$ The heap is empty.

$\{x \mapsto x'\}$ The heap contains one cell at address x with contents x' .

$\{P * Q\}$ The heap can be split in two disjoint cells. P holds for one, and Q for the other.

$\{P \multimap Q\}$ If the heap is extended by a disjoint part in which P holds, then Q holds for the extended heap.



What we try to prevent

- Overflows (buffer, heap stack, integer etc...)
- Format string attacks
- Code injections
- Race Conditions

What we can prevent

- Overflows (buffer, heap stack, integer etc...)

Defense

Bounds checking, regions and upcasting.

- Format string attacks
- Code injections
- Race Conditions

Defense



Mutex locks and re-entrant functions.



A buffer/stack overflow example

```
void f(char *data) {  
    ...  
    char s[10];  
  
    /* No bounds check done */  
    strcat(s, data);  
    ...  
}  
  
void main(int argc, char **argv) 10  
{  
    f(argv[1]);  
}
```

Buffer overflow diagram



Bounds checking for buffer overflows

- We model the allocation of an array in Hoare logic:

Allocation

$$\{emp\} x = new(k) \left\{ \prod_{i=0}^{k-1} [x + i] \mapsto - \right\} \text{ where } \prod_{i=0}^{k-1} x_i = x_0 * x_1 * \dots * x_k$$

- Knowing the size of the allocated array we can reason on indexes whenever a pointer operation takes place:

Attempted assignment

$$\frac{\left\{ \prod_{i=0}^k a+i \mapsto - \wedge j \leq k \right\} [a+j] := m \left\{ \prod_{i=0}^k a+i \mapsto - \right\}, \left\{ \prod_{i=0}^k a+i \mapsto - \wedge j > k \right\} skip \left\{ \prod_{i=0}^k a+i \mapsto - \right\}}{\left\{ \prod_{i=0}^k a+i \mapsto - \right\} \text{ if } j \leq k \text{ then } [a+j] := m \text{ else skip fi } \left\{ \prod_{i=0}^k a+i \mapsto - \right\}}$$



Integer overflow example

- Suppose that integers a and b hold the maximum possible value an integer of type “int” can hold.
- The result will be undefined. It may either wrap around or just truncate at maximum value.
- In case “result” would hold logical meaning or used to manage memory the results could be undefined.

...

```
int a, b, result;  
result = a + b;
```

...

Upcasting for integer overflows

- Given two integers defined on 8 bits and a third one defined on 16 bits:

Precondition

$$\{\exists a, b, result \in int8_t \wedge result = a + b \wedge \exists temp \in int16_t \wedge int8_t \subset int16_t\}$$

- Upcast one member of the sum and store in the temporary variable:

Command

$$temp = (int16_t)a + b;$$

- If it does overflow, don't proceed with the assignment, otherwise downcast and assign. We use the IF axiom to infer:

IF axiom, precondition, assignment and postcondition

$$\{temp = a + b\} \text{if } temp < \max(int8_t) \wedge temp > \min(int8_t) \text{ then } result = (int8_t)temp; \text{ else error fi } \{result < \max(int8_t) \wedge result > \min(int8_t)\}$$



A concurrency example

```
char *global_pointer;
```

```
...
```

```
void f() {
```

```
...
```

```
    free(global_pointer);
```

```
...
```

```
}
```

```
int main(void) {
```

```
...
```

```
    global_pointer = (char *) calloc(10, sizeof(char));
```

```
...
```


```
    signal(SIGHUP, f);
```

```
    signal(SIGTERM, f);
```

```
...
```

```
}
```

Buffer overflow diagram



Using mutex locks and flags

- We use mutex locks for thread safety and a flag for re-entry safety:

Mutex locks and flags

```
{ $\exists x.x \mapsto lk = 0 \wedge \exists flag.flag = 0 * Q$ }  
pthread_mutex_lock(ptr);  
{ $x \mapsto lk = TID \wedge flag = 0 * Q$ }  
dispose(ptr);  
{ $x \mapsto lk = TID \wedge flag = 0 * (ptr \mapsto \_) -* Q$ }  
[flag]=[flag]+1;  
{ $x \mapsto lk = TID \wedge flag = 1 * Q_{rest}$ }  
pthread_mutex_unlock(ptr);  
{ $x \mapsto lk = 0 \wedge flag = 1 * Q_{rest}$ }
```

What we intend to do...

- Analyse and gather data about common exploits and research their cause.
- Introduce **programming features** instead of limiting the user but making sure they have a sound foundation in programming logic.
- Use **separation logic** and **Hoare logic** to describe events happening in a program to eliminate the possibility of any point of failure.
- Analyse code and decide what is secure and what not and point out the problem to the programmer.